Paranoid Penguin - Brutally Practical Linux Desktop Security
What about Targeted Malware?
I don't want you to come away from this with the notion that malware never figures into Linux security or that it never will. In settings where you can't control what software people run or install on their systems or can't fully enforce automated, timely patching, good antivirus software is essential.
And, I worry quite a bit about targeted malware—that is, hostile code that has been custom created to attack a specific organization or individual. That is becoming an increasingly common tool used by organized crime in stealing large quantities of sensitive data (most typically credit-card numbers and identity data) from specific organizations. Often, the worm or virus will be “planted” in the target network by someone with inside access.
Because a given worm, virus or trojan of this type has been “handcrafted” and never has been released against the general public, there's zero likelihood that any antivirus software vendor even will know about it, let alone provide antivirus signatures that can detect it. Mainstream, signature-based antivirus software is, therefore, generally useless against targeted malware. For this and other reasons, targeted malware is very, very difficult to defend against, even with good patching practices.
But, this article isn't about protecting large networks or even about defending yourself from targeted attacks by well-funded attackers. It's about protecting yourself from attacks by more or less random strangers you may encounter on the Internet, at your local coffee shop's wireless LAN and so forth. And in those contexts, I don't worry very much about Linux malware.
So, assuming you're fully patched already—and I assure you I am—let's get busy disabling network listeners. The first step in doing this is to find them. If I run the command netstat --inet -al on my Ubuntu laptop, I see what is shown in Listing 1.
Listing 1. Network Listeners (Pre-Hardening)
Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address Foreign Address State tcp 0 0 *:swat *:* LISTEN tcp 0 0 *:ssh *:* LISTEN tcp 0 0 localhost:ipp *:* LISTEN tcp 0 0 *:3128 *:* LISTEN udp 0 0 iwazaru:netbios-ns *:* udp 0 0 *:netbios-ns *:* udp 0 0 iwazaru:netbios-dgm *:* udp 0 0 *:netbios-dgm *:* udp 0 0 *:49176 *:* udp 0 0 *:57500 *:* udp 0 0 *:icpv2 *:* udp 0 0 *:bootpc *:* udp 0 0 *:mdns *:*
You can see I'm running the Swat front end for administering Samba services, the Secure Shell dæmon, the Internet Printing Protocol and Squid (whose default port is TCP 3128). Hmm, you'd never guess that I recently wrote articles on Samba and Squid, would you?
Well, those articles are long finished, so right now I don't have any compelling reason to keep any of these services running, especially when I travel. I not only need to shut them down, but also disable their startup scripts. I could simply uninstall them, but I might need them later. Still, as a general rule, if you can uninstall unnecessary software, you should. Doing so via your preferred package manager is simple enough for me to skip describing here.
At the application level, I can use Swat to shut down Samba cleanly. This clobbers the netbios nameservice (netbios-ns) and netbios datagram (netbios-dgm) udp listeners in Listing 1. But, I also need to disable the Samba startup scripts and Swat itself.
Distributions vary in how they handle startup scripts for system dæmons like these. On SUSE, you can use YaST2 or the command insserv. On Red Hat, Fedora and CentOS systems, use the command chkconfig.
Because my system runs Ubuntu, I can use either the Services Settings applet (Figure 1) in my X Window System's Applications menu or the update-rc.d command. Let's start with the Services Settings applet, which, by the way, is part of GNOME and, therefore, may very well be installed on your non-Ubuntu GNOME desktop too.
Figure 1 shows the Services Settings applet after I've already clicked the Unlock button and provided my root password. Figure 1 also shows the bottom of the list of services running on my system, but that's where some of the juicier items are. I definitely want to uncheck the boxes next to Proxy cache service (squid), Remote shell server (ssh) and Web server (apache2).
What about Printer service (cups)? I'll disable that too, because at DEFCON, it's highly unlikely I'll need to print anything (or even have the opportunity to). But, note that as Listing 1 shows, my system is listening only for incoming IPP connections on the loopback interface (localhost:ipp). It isn't listening for remote connections to this service.
Me being me, I'll disable it anyhow. A “local” attack vector is local only until some other process is hijacked by a remote attacker, at which point the hijacked process might be used to spawn some other process that can attach to the thing having the “local” vulnerability.
Along the same lines—that is, in the interests of generalized paranoia—I'll also disable the following in Services Settings (not shown in Figure 1):
Account information resolver (winbind).
Folder sharing service (samba).
Multicast DNS service discovery (avahi-daemon).
Network service (xinetd).
Those are all things I'm sure I can live without in an untrusted environment. File sharing in particular, in the form of Samba and its winbind service, is to be avoided in such settings. Now if I re-run my netstat --inet -al command, I see only what is shown in Listing 2.
- Server Hardening
- May 2016 Issue of Linux Journal
- EnterpriseDB's EDB Postgres Advanced Server and EDB Postgres Enterprise Manager
- The Humble Hacker?
- BitTorrent Inc.'s Sync
- The US Government and Open-Source Software
- The Death of RoboVM
- Open-Source Project Secretly Funded by CIA
- New Container Image Standard Promises More Portable Apps
- ACI Worldwide's UP Retail Payments