Elliptic Curve Cryptography
The Mathematics of Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Elliptic Curve Cryptography has a reputation for being complex and highly technical. This isn't surprising when the Wikipedia article introduces an elliptic curve as "a smooth, projective algebraic curve of genus one". Elliptic curves also show up in the proof of Fermat's last theorem and the Birch and SwinnertonDyer conjecture. You can win a million dollars if you solve that problem.
To get a basic understanding of ECC, you need to understand four things:

The definition of an elliptic curve.

The elliptic curve group.

Scalar multiplication over the elliptic curve group.

Finite field arithmetic.
Essentially, elliptic curves are points on that satisfy an equation with the form:
y^{2} = x^{3} + ax + b
Figure 1 shows a picture of an elliptic curve over the real numbers where a is –1 and b is 1. Elliptic curves satisfy some interesting mathematical properties. The curve is symmetric around the x axis, so that if (x,y) is a point on the curve, then (x,–y) is also on the curve. If you draw a line between any two points on the line with different x coordinates, they will intersect the line at a unique third point. Finally, for each point on the curve, if you draw a straight line tangent to the cover from that point, it will intersect the curve once again at another point.
Figure 1. Elliptic Curve over Real Numbers
Mathematicians use these properties to form a structure called a group from the points on the elliptic curve. A group consists of a set of elements containing a special point (denoted 0), an operation for negating an element (denoted –x), and an operation for adding two elements (denoted x + y). The elements in the group defined by an elliptic curve consist of the points on the curve plus an additional point for 0 that is not on the curve, but as you'll see below is easiest to visualize as a line on the xaxis. To negate a point, you just negate the ycoordinate of the point, and adding a point to its negation is defined to return 0 (Figure 2). To add two points P and Q with different xcoordinates, draw a line connecting the two points and extending beyond them. This line should intersect the curve at a third point. The sum R = P + Q is the negation of the third point. Finally, to add a point P to itself, draw the line tangent to P (Figure 3). The sum R = 2P is the negation of the point that line intersects (Figure 4).
Figure 2. Negating a Point
Figure 3. Adding Two Points
Figure 4. Doubling a Point
Once the group is defined, we can talk about scalar multiplication—the fundamental operation that makes elliptic curves useful in cryptography. The kth scalar multiple of P is the point obtained by adding P to itself k times. This can be done efficiently by representing k as a binary number and using a doubleandadd multiplication method. If you are familiar with RSA, scalar multiplication plays a similar role in ECC that modular exponentiation plays in RSA.
The real numbers used in diagrams for explaining ECC are not practical to use in actual implementations. Real numbers can have an arbitrary number of digits, and computers have only a finite amount of memory. Most applications, including OpenSSL, use elliptic curves over coordinates that use modular arithmetic, where the modulus is a large prime number. Figure 5 shows the elliptic curve with the same equation as in Figure 1, but where arithmetic is performed modulo 19.
Figure 5. Elliptic Curve over Prime Field (mod 19)
For the different key sizes in Table 1, NIST recommends a specific elliptic curve with a prime modulus for that key size (see the Binary Fields sidebar). For each key size, NIST specifies three things:

The coefficients in the elliptic curve equation.

The size of the underlying field for representing x and y.

A base point that is a point of the curve to be used when calling scalar multiplication.
Joe Hendrix is a security researcher who works in Portland, Oregon, for Galois, Inc. His main interest is in applying formal verification techniques to real security problems.
As Linux continues to play an ever increasing role in corporate data centers and institutions, ensuring the integrity and protection of these systems must be a priority. With 60% of the world's websites and an increasing share of organization's missioncritical workloads running on Linux, failing to stop malware and other advanced threats on Linux can increasingly impact an organization's reputation and bottom line.
Sponsored by Bit9
Most companies incorporate backup procedures for critical data, which can be restored quickly if a loss occurs. However, fewer companies are prepared for catastrophic system failures, in which they lose all data, the entire operating system, applications, settings, patches and more, reducing their system(s) to “bare metal.” After all, before data can be restored to a system, there must be a system to restore it to.
In this one hour webinar, learn how to enhance your existing backup strategies for better disaster recovery preparedness using Storix System Backup Administrator (SBAdmin), a highly flexible baremetal recovery solution for UNIX and Linux systems.
Sponsored by Storix
Trending Topics
PostgreSQL, the NoSQL Database  Jan 29, 2015 
HPC Cluster Grant Accepting Applications!  Jan 28, 2015 
Sharing Admin Privileges for Many Hosts Securely  Jan 28, 2015 
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.1 beta available on IBM Power Platform  Jan 23, 2015 
Designing with Linux  Jan 22, 2015 
Wondershaper—QOS in a Pinch  Jan 21, 2015 
 PostgreSQL, the NoSQL Database
 Sharing Admin Privileges for Many Hosts Securely
 HPC Cluster Grant Accepting Applications!
 Internet of Things Blows Away CES, and it May Be Hunting for YOU Next
 Ideal Backups with zbackup
 Wondershaper—QOS in a Pinch
 Designing with Linux
 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.1 beta available on IBM Power Platform
 Slow System? iotop Is Your Friend
 January 2015 Issue of Linux Journal: Security
Comments
interesting article!
To the author:
This is a very interesting article! Question  I saw in Star Trek TNG episode cmdr. Data used Fractal Algorithm for encryption.
Is it realistic to use such an algorithm in real life or was it totally made up?
Thanks.
The basis for Web site
The basis for Web site encryption via SSL/TLS, server administration via SSH, secure email and IP encryption.
hello !!!
I like your work a lot. On the same occasion I invite you to visit my website prefer
Voyance sérieuse par telephone
Several things wrong here...
Over all, I found this article somewhat interesting (the ECC math part at least) and somewhat misleading (the recommendations part).
The table of key bit strengths is flat out wrong. It's really hand waving to compare bit lengths of symmetric algorithms with PK algol's in anything other than very general terms. It's really comparing apples and oranges and what tastes better.
DES key sizes, in particular, are not "recommended" and are, in fact, fixed by the algorithm and that table got them all very wrong. Single DES (insanely weak and not in the table) is a 56 bit key. 3DES ede (triple DES encryptdecryptencrypt aka 2 key DES) is 112 bits. Full blown 3DES with three completely independent keys is 168 bits. There's no such thing as 80 bit DES (1 key, 2 keys, or 3 keys) even if you consider violating the parity in the key bytes. The original DES had 8 byte keys but only considered 7 bits per byte with the high order bit as a "parity" bit (harken back to ASCII tty days?). 8 bytes with 7 bits per byte was 56 bits, period. Two key DES utilized two 56 bits keys, first "encrypting" with one and then "decrypting" (reverse algo) with the other, and then reencrypting with the first key again. Sounds strange but, if you think about it, it makes sense for backwards compatibility with single DES where both keys are the same. 80 bits keys for DES in any form at all makes no sense at all.
No DES variants are recommended in the modern Internet environment.
It's also misleading to argue about the smaller key size of ECC having better security. It's generally been recognized that ECC is more processor intensive than an equivalent strength RSA key and ECC doesn't have the track records that RSA has.
RSA keys up to 2048 bits are well supported on common crypto hardware such as smartcards. ECC support is generally poor to nonexistent at best, particularly in consumer grade smartcards.
The editing remark in the middle of some of the math was "amusing". Doesn't anybody read these bloody things before posting??? Yes, it's in the middle of a pile of math that some people may find mind numbing (the real math is worse  I can quote RSA off the top of my head, it's that simple, but ECC is bad) but still... I actually found the math part to be the bright spot and the faux paux editor remark to be worth a belly laugh at least.
The article contained no references to double check to see if they are valid or even still current! In particular, I would love to review the corresponding NIST recommendation, in particular given how often NIST standards, in regards to security in particular, are behind the times and out of date or have been updated as the state of the art progresses.
People are still quoting outofdate NIST standards that are no longer even supported by NIST and didn't make sense even back when NIST supported them. They eliminated the whole "7 pass overwrite erase" recommendation back in 2001 or there abouts and people STILL quote that ridiculous recommendation as if it were a standard.
Article feedback
Hi MWH,
Thanks for the feedback. I just saw this comment.
The comparison of different key lengths comes from NIST 80057 rev 3, which was published in July, 2012. Here's a link: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html.
I'm sorry if some of the information in the table was confusing. The table was not meant to suggest that DES used 80bit or 112bit keys. You are correct that DES key sizes are 56bits, and using triple DES with 2 keys and 3 keys respectively would involve keys with 112 and 168bits respectively. However, due to known cryptanalysis techniques, they're are likely faster attacks than exploring the entire keyspace. Hence, many cryptographers feel that 3DES offers a lower level of security than the full key size would suggest.
Your point that ECC is newer than RSA, and hence less time has been taken to evaluate it is true, but ECC is almost 2 decades old, and has been subject to significant cryptoanalysis efforts. I don't think this article makes recommendations that are out of alignment with what NIST or the NSA have publicly stated. If so, I'll try to see that the article is corrected.
I disagree with your assertion that it's hand waving to compare key sizes of different algorithms. All the algorithms mentioned in this article have been extensively studied, and systems that use cryptography often use multiple algorithms in concert. For example, browsers use public key crypto for key exchange and digital signatures, symmetric key for encryption, and secure hash functions for digital signatures and identity.
Guidance from standards organizations such as NIST, helps system designers make informed decisions about what algorithms and keysizes to use.
Ehem
You editing notes as showing.