Paranoid Penguin - AppArmor in Ubuntu 9
Three years ago, I devoted a couple columns (in the April and August 2006 issues of LJ) to Novell AppArmor, a partial implementation of Mandatory Access Controls (MACs) that Novell had integrated into SUSE Linux as part of its acquisition of Immunix. Novell also had released AppArmor's source code under the GPL. I expressed hope that other distributions soon would offer AppArmor as an easier-to-configure alternative to SELinux.
The good news is, during the three years since I wrote those articles, both Ubuntu and Mandriva have incorporated AppArmor into their respective distributions. Although until recently Ubuntu hasn't provided very much documentation on its AppArmor port—one might even characterize Ubuntu's AppArmor adoption as stealthful—AppArmor actually has been in Ubuntu since Ubuntu 7.10 (Gutsy Gibbon). In fact, I mentioned this inclusion in these very pages in the April 2008 issue, in my article “Security Features in Ubuntu Server”.
At the time, I commented that due to its lack of AppArmor GUI tools or documentation, AppArmor in Ubuntu 7.10 appeared to be targeted at expert users. With Ubuntu 9.04, I'm happy to report that although AppArmor in Ubuntu still is configured strictly via the command line, it's now amply documented and comes with a useful set of default profiles.
The bad news is, in late 2007, Novell laid off all four of its full-time AppArmor developers, raising serious questions about the future of AppArmor (see The Future of AppArmor sidebar).
Being a security goon, I'm not optimistic by nature. However, I do believe in making hay while the sun shines. If a compelling tool is available to you in Ubuntu 9.04, you should take advantage of it and not worry about whether that tool will be available in Ubuntu 11.04—unless, of course, that tool requires an enormous investment in your time, attention and thought.
But AppArmor, unlike most other MAC mechanism, is not such a tool. As I explain in this month's overview of AppArmor in Ubuntu, for many applications, you don't need to do anything to enable or configure AppArmor protection. For others, AppArmor essentially can train itself in protecting them.
So, let's take a look at AppArmor in Ubuntu.
In case you missed my earlier articles on this topic, AppArmor is based on the Linux Security Modules (LSMs), as is SELinux. AppArmor, however, provides only a subset of the controls SELinux provides. Whereas SELinux has methods for Type Enforcement (TE), Role-Based Access Controls (RBACs), and Multi-Level Security (MLS), AppArmor provides only a form of Type Enforcement.
Type Enforcement involves confining a given application to a specific set of actions, such as writing to Internet network sockets, reading a specific file and so forth. RBAC involves restricting user activity based on the defined role, and MLS involves limiting access to a given resource based on its data classification (or label).
By focusing on Type Enforcement, AppArmor provides protection against, arguably, the most common Linux attack scenario—the possibility of an attacker exploiting vulnerabilities in a given application that allows the attacker to perform activities not intended by the application's developer or administrator. By creating a baseline of expected application behavior and blocking all activity that falls outside that baseline, AppArmor (potentially) can mitigate even zero-day (unpatched) software vulnerabilities.
What AppArmor cannot do, however, is prevent abuse of an application's intended functionality. For example, the Secure Shell dæmon, SSHD, is designed to grant shell access to remote users. If an attacker figures out how to break SSHD's authentication by, for example, entering just the right sort of gibberish in the user name field of an SSH login session, resulting in SSHD giving the attacker a remote shell as some authorized user, AppArmor may very well allow the attack to proceed, as the attack's outcome is perfectly consistent with what SSHD would be expected to do after successful login.
If, on the other hand, an attacker figured out how to make the CUPS print services dæmon add a line to /etc/passwd that effectively creates a new user account, AppArmor could prevent that attack from succeeding, because CUPS has no reason to be able to write to the file /etc/passwd.
In SUSE's and Ubuntu's AppArmor implementations, AppArmor comes with an assortment of pretested profiles for popular server and client applications and with simple tools for creating your own AppArmor profiles. On Ubuntu systems, most of the pretested profiles are enabled by default. There's nothing you need to do to install or enable them.
Other Ubuntu AppArmor profiles are installed, but set to run in complain mode, in which AppArmor only logs unexpected application behavior to /var/log/messages rather than both blocking and logging it. You either can leave them that way, if you're satisfied with just using AppArmor as a watchdog for those applications (in which case, you should keep an eye on /var/log/messages), or you can switch them to enforce mode yourself, although, of course, you should test thoroughly first.
Still other profiles are provided by Ubuntu's optional apparmor-profiles package. Whereas ideally a given AppArmor profile should be incorporated into its target application's package, for now at least, apparmor-profiles is sort of a catchall for emerging and not-quite-stable profiles that, for whatever reason, aren't appropriate to bundle with their corresponding packages.
Active AppArmor profiles reside in /etc/apparmor.d. The files at the root of this directory are parsed and loaded at boot time automatically. The apparmor-profiles package installs some of its profiles there, but puts experimental profiles in /usr/share/doc/apparmor-profiles/extras.
The Ubuntu 9.04 packages shown in Table 1 put corresponding profiles into /etc/apparmor.d.
Table 1. Ubuntu Packages Having AppArmor Profiles
|Ubuntu Package Name||AppArmor Default Mode||Package Description|
|bind||enforce||The BIND DNS server|
|clamd||enforce||ClamAV antivirus scanner|
|cups||enforce||Print services dæmon|
|dhcp3-client||enforce||ISC's DHCP client|
|dhcp3-server||enforce||ISC's DHCP server|
|mysql||enforce||MySQL database engine|
|slapd||enforce||OpenLDAP LDAP server|
|tcpdump||enforce||Command-line network sniffer|
If you install the package apparmor-profiles, you'll additionally get default protection for the packages shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Packages Whose AppArmor Profiles Are Provided by apparmor-profiles
|Ubuntu Package Name||AppArmor Default Mode||Package Description|
|ping||complain||Network diagnostic tool|
|klogd||complain||Kernel message logger|
|syslogd||complain||Berkeley system message logger|
|syslog-ng||complain||Syslog-NG system message logger|
|avahi-daemon||enforce||Multicast-DNS (network auto-discover)|
|dnsmasq||complain||DNS/DHCP forwarder used for Internet connection sharing|
|identd||complain||Maps user names to processes/sockets|
|mdnsd||complain||Scans for Multicast-DNS services|
|nmbd||complain||Part of Samba (MS file sharing)|
|nscd||complain||Nameservice (DNS) Caching Dæmon|
|ntpd||complain||Network Time Protocol Dæmon|
|smbd||complain||Part of Samba (MS file sharing)|
|traceroute||complain||Network diagnostic tool|
The lists in Tables 1 and 2 are perhaps as notable for what they lack as for what they include. Although such high-profile server applications as BIND, MySQL, Samba, NTPD and CUPS are represented, very notably absent are Apache, Postfix, Sendmail, Squid and SSHD. And, what about important client-side network tools like Firefox, Skype, Evolution, Acrobat and Opera?
Profiles for those applications and many more are provided by apparmor-profiles in /usr/share/doc/apparmor-profiles/extras, but because they reside there rather than /etc/apparmor.d, they're effectively disabled. These profiles are disabled either because they haven't yet been updated to work with the latest version of whatever package they protect or because they don't yet provide enough protection relative to the Ubuntu AppArmor team's concerns about their stability.
Testing and tweaking such profiles is beyond the scope of this article, but suffice it to say, it involves the logprof command.
Practical Task Scheduling Deployment
July 20, 2016 12:00 pm CDT
One of the best things about the UNIX environment (aside from being stable and efficient) is the vast array of software tools available to help you do your job. Traditionally, a UNIX tool does only one thing, but does that one thing very well. For example, grep is very easy to use and can search vast amounts of data quickly. The find tool can find a particular file or files based on all kinds of criteria. It's pretty easy to string these tools together to build even more powerful tools, such as a tool that finds all of the .log files in the /home directory and searches each one for a particular entry. This erector-set mentality allows UNIX system administrators to seem to always have the right tool for the job.
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