Shielded CPUs: Real-Time Performance in Standard Linux
RedHawk Linux version 1.3, from Concurrent Computer Corporation, was used to measure interrupt response on a shielded CPU. RedHawk is a Linux kernel based on kernel.org 2.4.21. It should be noted that shielded CPUs are only one of the real-time enhancements made to the RedHawk Linux kernel. Some of the other enhancements also contributed to the reported performance numbers below. For example, various open-source patches have been applied to this kernel, including Robert Love's preemption patch, Andrew Morton's low-latency patches and the O(1) scheduler from the 2.5 Linux tree. Other changes that might impact the performance of this test include algorithmic changes to reduce the remaining worst-case critical sections in the Linux kernel and changes to allow bottom-half interrupt processing to be performed inside of a kernel dæmon, whose scheduling policy and priority can be specified.
Figure 1 compares the interrupt response measured under RedHawk Linux using a shielded CPU and without using a shielded CPU. The difference between these runs is striking. In both test cases, most of the time the system was able to respond to the RTC interrupt in less than 100 microseconds. This shows that, in general, Linux responds to an interrupt in a timely manner. However, as stated above, the most important aspect of system metrics for a real-time system is the worst-case timings. This is because the worst cases are examples of system behavior that can cause a real-time application to miss its deadline.
In the shielded CPU case, the worst-case interrupt response time for the RTC interrupt was 220 microseconds. In the case where CPU shielding was not used, all interrupts responded in less than 10 milliseconds, an order of magnitude worse than the worst-case interrupt response time on a shielded CPU. Although less than one percent of the samples in this test case were greater than 200 microseconds, in many thousands of cases the interrupt response exceeded 500 microseconds. In a real-time system, each of these cases would be an opportunity for a missed deadline.
The same interrupt response test also was run on an unmodified 2.4.21 kernel.org kernel (Figure 2) as well as on Red Hat version 8.0 (Figure 3). This Red Hat kernel does not contain the preemption patch, but it does contain the low-latency patches, which are meant to address the longest critical sections in the Linux kernel. Because shielded CPUs are not present in either of these kernels, the results are reported only for the non-shielded case.
These kernels show a typical interrupt response time similar to that measured on the RedHawk kernel, with most interrupts occurring in less than 100 microseconds. However, the worst-case interrupt response for these kernels is even worse than the non-shielded case under RedHawk Linux, with kernel.org showing a worst-case interrupt response of 107 milliseconds and Red Hat showing a worst-case interrupt response of 323 milliseconds. These results are not surprising considering that these kernels are tuned to achieve fairness between the processes that share the system and for general system throughput rather than for guaranteed real-time response.
It has been shown that a shielded CPU offers a significant improvement in the worst-case interrupt response time for a Linux system. Shielded CPUs are effective because they reserve critical computing resources for the highest priority tasks in the system. This is accomplished without affecting the standard application programming interface of Linux.
This article has discussed only the response to the RTC interrupt; it was chosen because it is a standard feature in most Linux implementations. It is possible, however, to achieve even better interrupt response guarantees by using other interrupt sources and more highly optimized device drivers. For a more extensive exploration of the shielded CPU concept as well as test results for a device driver that provides an even better interrupt response guarantee, see the whitepaper at www.ccur.com/isddocs/wp-shielded-cpu.pdf.
Stephen Brosky is Chief Scientist of the Integrated Solutions Division of Concurrent Computer Corporation. He was also a member of the IEEE committee that developed the POSIX 1003.1b and 1003.1c standards for real-time application interfaces and threads interfaces.
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