An Introduction to FreeS/WAN, Part II
Another ground rule for this scenario is using RSA authentication rather than a “shared secret”. While I don't want to completely re-explain last month's material on host key generation and maintenance, it's important to review the most important points.
You hopefully recall that each host running FreeS/WAN should have a unique host key; you should not use the default key provided by the FreeS/WAN binary package you installed. Once you've generated a new key on a given host, however, you'll be able to use that key for as many different tunnels as that host needs. The key remains useful for as long as the secret portion of the host key (stored in /etc/ipsec.secrets) is kept hidden or until advances in cryptanalysis render your host key too short. (Actually, the chances of this occurring before FreeS/WAN itself becomes obsolete for some reason are pretty slim.)
To generate a new host key using FreeS/WAN 1.92 or higher, enter this command:
# ipsec newhostkey --hostname my.host.fqdn \ --output /etc/ipsec.secrets --bits 2192
This generates a 2192-bit RSA key, saving both its public and private components in /etc/ipsec.secrets. I didn't point out last month that because these commands deal with RSA keys, longer key lengths are required than for, say, a block cipher such as 3DES.
Do not be tempted, therefore, to use a value of 128, 196 or some other three-figure number for newhostkey --bits. Public key mechanisms such as RSA and DSA work differently, and their keys must be roughly ten times longer than block- and stream-ciphers' keys. 1,096 bits is the smallest RSA key size you should even consider; 2,192 is much safer.
To display your new public key in a format that can be directly copied and pasted into tunnel definitions, use this command:
bash-# ipsec showhostkey --left
You can use the option --right instead if you want to print a rightrsasigkey statement instead of a leftrsakey statement.
Remember, the output of this command may be shared safely. It contains only the public component of your host's signing key. You may e-mail it without encryption, post it on a web site or set it to music and sing about it at your favorite coffee shop. This is why RSA authentication is more convenient than shared-secret authentication, in which you must securely and covertly send the authentication credentials (shared-secret string) to another site any time you wish to build an IPSec tunnel. RSA authentication allows you to be sloppy (except with /etc/ipsec.secrets, which must be kept root-readable-only at all times); shared-secret authentication does not.
FreeS/WAN's main configuration file, other than /etc/ipsec.secrets, is /etc/ipsec.conf. In the interest of simplifying things, FreeS/WAN was designed in such a way that tunnel definitions usually look the same on both endpoints of a FreeS/WAN tunnel. Most of the example lines that follow, therefore, are the same on both firewalls in our example scenario.
Last month I focused mainly on tunnel definitions. We'll get to them here, too. But first, let's delve a little deeper into the config setup and conn %default sections. Listing 1 shows a config setup for one of our firewalls (it doesn't matter which one).
The first parameter in Listing 1, interfaces, is crucial. It defines the interface on which the host will listen for IPSec connections from other IPSec servers. This is not to be confused with the interface on which the host listens for packets sent through the tunnel. If you think of the Internet (or other untrusted network) as the outside and the local LAN as the inside, always make sure that the interfaces' parameter is set to your outside interface.
The two debug options, klipsdebug and plutodebug, determine how much logging is done by FreeS/WAN's kernel-interface dæmon (KLIPS) and IKE keying dæmon (Pluto), respectively. Both of these parameters accept the self-explanatory magic values all and none, plus a variety of specific IPSec attributes/events that can be logged. See the ipsec_klipsdebug(8) and ipse_pluto(8) man pages for complete lists of these.
The parameter plutoload specifies which tunnel definitions to initialize when FreeS/WAN starts up. The magic value %search tells Pluto to check each subsequent tunnel definition's auto parameter to determine this (i.e., each tunnel for which auto is set to add).
Similarly, the value plutostart tells Pluto which tunnels to try to connect to automatically when FreeS/WAN starts. In other words, whereas plutoload merely tells Pluto to allow other hosts to bring up specified tunnels, plutostart tells Pluto itself to bring up specified tunnels, without waiting for their other endpoints. Again, the %search value may be specified. In this case, it will match tunnel definitions in which auto is set to start.
Listing 2 shows the subsequent conn %default section in an ipsec.conf file. The first parameter in Listing 2, keyingtries, is set to zero, which actually translates to no limit. This means when Pluto tries to bring up or replace a tunnel, it tries to key it as many times as necessary. This is a reasonable setting for a site-to-site VPN in which both hosts have persistent network connections, but it's not for a remote-access VPN in which remote clients will be on-line only sporadically.
disablearrivalcheck, if set to no, causes KLIPS to make sure that each packet entering the host from an IPSec tunnel has plausible source- and destination-IP addresses in its header. The default value is yes, which prevents these checks, but you should set it to no unless you really know what you're doing.
Finally, authby lets you choose the default authentication method for tunnels, which, as I said earlier, will be via RSA (rsasig) for our example scenario. And now we arrive at our actual tunnel definition—it's displayed in Listing 3.
Because this is a site-to-site scenario, FreeS/WAN's convention of server = left, remote-access clients = right isn't meaningful. So it's completely arbitrary which side is designated right or left. The important thing is to be consistent across the tunnel definitions in both hosts' setups. Here, the site to the left of the Internet (Figure 3) is left, and the site to the right of the Internet is right. That sounds obvious, but if I were to decide to make right left and vice versa, the tunnel would behave the same (provided I used the same configuration on both sides).
As you can see, in Listing 3, left is set to the external (Internet-reachable, tunnel-listening) interface's IP address. leftsubnet, however, is set to the address of the network that receives incoming packets (i.e., leaving the tunnel).
leftnexthop is the IP address of the next hop between the firewall/IPSec host and the Internet. And leftrsasigkey obviously is the host key of left. This line (and the comment above it) can be obtained verbatim by running the command ipsec showhostkey --left.
The right parameters are the same, but for the right side. I leave it to you to use your powers of deduction to figure out to which hosts in Figure 3 these parameters correspond.
Finally, we have the tunnel's auto parameter, which is set to start. When the Pluto dæmon executes its search for instructions on what to do with tunnel definitions at startup (as described in the section following Listing 1), this setting tells it to initiate the tunnel defined above.
As I've been hinting, in this example scenario, the /etc/ipsec.conf files for both firewalls and gateways are identical. Once they're set up, we can start IPSec on each host and start tunneling. The command to do this on most distributions is:
bash-# /etc/init.d/ipsec start
If IPSec is already running, use:
bash-# /etc/init.d/ipsec restartOnce IPSec has been (re)started on both hosts, the tunnel will come up, and each gateway will begin routing traffic addressed to the other network through the tunnel. This routing is done automatically, based on the leftsubnet and rightsubnet parameters defined in your tunnel definition in /etc/ipsec.conf.
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