Taking Advantage of Linux Capabilities

Concentrating on user privileges to appease the security paranoid.
The System Call Interface

As of this writing, the syscalls capset and capget manipulate capabilities for a process. There are no guarantees that this interface won't change. Portable applications are encouraged to use libcap (www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.4) instead.

The prototype for capset is

int capset(cap_user_header_t header,
const cap_user_data_t data);

HEADER is a fancy way to say which pid you're operating on:

typedef struct __user_cap_header_struct {
        __u32 version;
        int pid;
} *cap_user_header_t;
If pid is -1, you will modify the capabilities of all currently running processes. Less than -1 and you modify the process group equal to pid times -1. The semantics are similar to those of kill(2).

The DATA argument allows you to choose which capability sets you plan to modify. There are three:

typedef struct __user_cap_data_struct {
        __u32 effective;
        __u32 permitted;
        __u32 inheritable;
} *cap_user_data_t;

The permitted set contains all of the capabilities that a process is ultimately capable of realizing.

The effective set is the capabilities a process has elected to utilize from its permitted set. It's as if you had a huge arsenal of poetry (permitted set) but chose only to arm yourself with Allen Ginsberg for the task at hand (effective set).

The inheritable set defines which capabilities may be passed on to any programs that replace the current process image via exec(2). Please note that fork(2) does nothing special with capabilities. The child simply receives an exact copy of all three capabilities sets.

Only capabilities in the permitted set can be added to the effective or inheritable set. Capabilities cannot be added to the permitted set of a process unless CAP_SETPCAP is set.

The Filesystem Interface

Sadly, capabilities still lack filesystem support, limiting their usefulness to a degree. Someday, the mainstream kernels will allow you to enable capabilities in a program's inode, obviating the setuid bit in many system utilities.

Once fully supported, permitting the ping utility to open raw sockets could be as simple as:

chattr +CAP_NET_RAW /bin/ping

Unfortunately, more pressing kernel issues have delayed work in this area.

If you're so inclined, you can use libcap to hack your favorite services so that they are capability-aware and drop the privileges they no longer need at startup. Several patches exist for xntpd that do just this; some even provide their modified version as an RPM. Try a Google search if you're interested in a capability-aware version of some root-level process you find yourself often shaking a fist at.

setpcap can be used to modify the capability set of an existing process. For example, if the PID of a regular user's shell is 4235, here's how you can give that user's shell the ability to send signals to any process:

setpcaps 'cap_kill=ep' 4235

An example use of this would be to allow a friend who is using your machine to debug a CGI script to kill any Apache processes that get stuck in infinite loops. You'd run it against their login shell once and forget about them.

Here's an example that utilizes execcap and sucap to run ping as the user “nobody”, with only the CAP_NET_RAW capability. Our target of choice for ping is www.yahoo.com:

execcap 'cap_net_raw=ep' /sbin/sucap nobody
nobody /bin/ping www.yahoo.com

This sample isn't terribly useful because you need to be root to execute it, but it does illustrate what is possible. Despite some of these shortcomings, system administrators still can take measures to increase the security of their system. A system without CAP_SYS_BOOT, CAP_SYS_RAWIO and CAP_SYS_MODULE is extremely difficult for an intruder to modify. They cannot hack kernel memory, install new modules or restart the system so that it runs a backdoored kernel.

If your system logs are append-only and your core system utilities immutable (see chattr(3) for details), removing the CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE capability will make it virtually impossible for intruders to erase their tracks or install compromised utilities. Traffic sniffers like tcpdump become unusable once CAP_NET_RAW is removed. Remove CAP_SYS_PTRACE and you've turned off program debugging. Such a hostile environment is a script kiddy's worst nightmare, and there is no choice but to disconnect and wait for the intrusion to be discovered.

______________________

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Doesn't work for me.

Anonymous's picture

# execcap 'cap_net_raw=ep' /sbin/sucap nobody nobody /bin/ping www.yahoo.com
Caps: =ep cap_setpcap-ep
Caps: =
[debug] uid:65534, real uid:65534
sucaps: capsetp: Operation not permitted
sucap: child did not exit cleanly.

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