Secure Logging Over a Network
Both ways are effective for remote logging, and they are almost equivalent. We wanted to describe both, since one could be easier to use in some environments. For example, if you don't have sshd running on the machine where you want to store the logs, you could just install the ssh client in your home and use the second solution. Also, we wished to point out some interesting problems that can arise in communicating over a network.
The first method uses a somewhat “real time” logging. Each time a message is generated by syslog, it is sent through the pipe to the other side if possible. So, once something is generated by syslog, it is sent (in normal circumstances, of course) and can't be stopped in any way. This is a great feature for such a system, but causes a general process communication problem: buffering. Since the pipe that serves as a communication link between syslogd and the program was opened in non-blocking mode and has a finite buffer size, if syslog generates data too fast, then the data will be lost. If it could open it in blocking mode, we could solve this problem, but then if the pipe couldn't get free space in a short time, the process would just freeze and lose other data. This is an interesting problem of real-time communication. Practically, it shouldn't be a problem, since if you intelligently select which syslog facilities to send over the network and a decent connection exists between the two machines, then the buffer shouldn't get filled so quickly.
As a way of solving this possible data loss, the second program will read the logs from a disk file, jumping over the buffering problem (the disk file is the growing buffer, so it doesn't have such restricted limitations). Of course, this isn't a “real-time” solution, since tail has to check whether the file changes in given time periods, otherwise it would constantly be using the CPU to check for changes; see the --sleep interval in the info file. So theoretically in this short time period, a malicious cracker should find your program running and kill it (again, very improbable).
As to the security of the account used for the secure shell, the two methods are both secure if the restrictions are set correctly as explained. There shouldn't be a direct way to break from one machine to the other by using the restricted logging access, since nothing but the designed command can be used. Of course, you should have noticed that once a break-in is made on the machine we are logging, the cracker can initiate a denial-of-service attack by trying to fill the disk space on the remote machine. This is an old problem with logging and can be dealt with simply by placing the logs on a non-vital (that is, a non-root) partition or by using quotas if possible. Since the script doesn't need any other special permission to be executed, it is also evident that there aren't any root-privilege process problems.
Federico (firstname.lastname@example.org) is studying computer science at the University of Udine. When not hacking or coding, he enjoys reading science fiction, listening to music and playing guitar.
Christian (email@example.com) is studying astrophysics at the University of Trieste and works part-time as a system administrator and high school teacher. When not playing with Linux and other fun software or hardware, he enjoys discussing who is the best film director of all time with his girlfriend.
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